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Public Functions and Amenability: Recent Trends 
 
Dr Alexander Williams 
Lecturer in Law, University of Durham 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The vexed question of which functions are public and amenable to judicial 
review has generated considerable volumes of case-law and academic 
discussion over the years. In this piece I consider the general principles in this 
area before examining their application in three recent cases from 2016. These 
are R (Holmcroft Properties) v KPMG LLP [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), R 
(Macleod) v Governors of Peabody Trust [2016] EWHC 737 (Admin) and 
T.H. v Chapter of Worcester Cathedral [2016] EWHC 1117 (Admin). Space 
precludes an analysis of the related but distinct issue of amenability to ECHR 
challenge under s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which I leave to one side. 
 
2. There has been little attempt by the courts or academic authors to reduce the 
case-law on the meaning of a public function to a single, defensible test. The 
only author to have attempted both to explain and justify the courts’ approach 
in this way is Colin D. Campbell, who argues that a public function is, and 
should be, a monopoly power: ‘Monopoly Power as Public Power for the 
Purposes of Judicial Review’ (2009) 125 LQR 491. The argument contains a 
number of serious flaws that are explored in detail in Alexander Williams, 
‘Judicial Review and Monopoly Power: Some Sceptical Thoughts’ (2017/18) 
LQR (forthcoming). 
 
General Principles 
 
3. The amenability case-law reveals the following fundamentals. 
 
4. First, the courts’ focus is on the nature of the function, not the institutional 
nature of the defendant itself. Private bodies may perform public functions, 
e.g. when a private psychiatric hospital uses its statutory powers to detain and 
treat inpatients against their will: R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] 
EWHC 529 (Admin). Conversely, public bodies may perform private 
functions that are not therefore amenable to judicial review, notably when 
exercising contractual disciplinary powers (see below). 
 
5. Second, nor is the courts’ focus simply on the source of the power, source and 
nature being distinct. In R v Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin 
Plc [1987] QB 815, at 847, Lloyd LJ stated that he did ‘not agree that the 
source of the power is the sole test whether a body is subject to judicial 
review’, and that it could be ‘helpful to look not just at the source of the power 
but at the nature of the power,’ in the context of the de facto regulatory power 
exercised by the Takeover Panel. In R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses 
Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, at 246, Simon Brown J observed that Datafin gave 
‘clear emphasis to the “functions” test as opposed to the “source of power” 
test’. 
6. Third, there is ‘no universal test’ for a public function, as Woolf J stated in R v 
Derbyshire County Council, ex p Noble [1990] ICR 808, at 819. Instead, the 
courts perform what has been called a ‘multi-factorial assessment’ involving 
the balancing of a number of competing considerations: R (Weaver) v London 
& Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA 587, at [119] (Rix LJ). The issue is 
said to be ‘one of overall impression, and one of degree’: R v Legal Aid Board, 
ex p Donn [1996] 3 All ER 1, at 11 (Ognall J). Scott Baker LJ has remarked 
that it is ‘often as much a matter of feel, as deciding whether any particular 
criteria are met’: R (Tucker) v Director General of the National Crime Squad 
[2003] EWCA Civ 57, at [13]. 
 
7. Fourth, functions with a public element ‘may take many different forms’: 
Datafin, at 838 (Donaldson MR). The statutory functions of central and local 
government bodies will in many cases be amenable to review. The courts’ 
jurisdiction also extends to prerogative functions, as well as to certain forms of 
de facto power exercised by non-state bodies, as in Datafin, ‘without visible 
means of legal support’: Datafin, at 824 (Donaldson MR). 
 
8. Fifth, the exercise of contractual discretion tends to be routinely excluded 
from the scope of judicial review, even discretion exercised by obviously 
public bodies such as local authorities. One of many examples is R v East 
Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh [1985] QB 152, which involved the 
exercise by a health authority of its contractual discretion to dismiss a senior 
nursing officer for misconduct.
1
 The courts have long been hostile to the idea 
of subjecting the exercise of contractual power by monopoly regulators like 
the Jockey Club to judicial review: see e.g. R v Disciplinary Committee of the 
Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909; R v Jockey Club, ex p 
Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207. 
  
9. Although the hostility to reviewing contractual discretion tends to undermine 
the idea that nature and source of power are different concepts, the strength of 
judicial conviction on the matter is palpable. Brooke LJ has described the 
logic of the position against reviewing the exercise of contractual discretion as 
‘unassailable’: R (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506, at [30]. 
In Datafin (at 838) Donaldson MR described it as an ‘essential element’ of the 
law in this area that ‘bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual 
submission to its [sic.] jurisdiction’ are excluded from the scope of judicial 
review.
2
 
 
10. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with the multi-factorial approach that the courts 
have refrained from establishing a bright-line rule that the exercise of 
contractual discretion can never be reviewable, as explained in R (McIntyre) v 
Gentoo Ltd [2010] EWHC 5 (Admin): ‘The fact that a right may have been 
exercised in accordance with the terms of a contract that confers it does not 
necessarily mean that the decision to exercise that right is one that may not be 
                                                 
1
 cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Benwell [1985] QB 554 (disciplinary powers 
not contractual). 
2
 In appropriate circumstances private law may of course be used to apply substantive principles of 
fairness similar to those available in judicial review: see e.g. Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633; Bradley 
v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. 
invalid as a matter of public law’: at [29] (John Howell QC). For these reasons 
the mere presence of a contract between claimant and defendant will also not 
preclude review, as illustrated in cases like Weaver and Macleod (above), 
discussed below. 
 
11. By far the thorniest issue in this area is the meaning of a public function as 
applied to non-state defendants exercising de facto power, which is the subject 
of the remainder of this piece. Datafin was a landmark ruling for recognising 
that judicial review could extend to de facto as well as statutory and 
prerogative power, but the courts have struggled to apply the ruling clearly 
and consistently. In Holmcroft (above), Elias LJ and Mitting J observed (at 
[23]) that the amenability question ‘is not always easily answered’. 
 
12. The issue is bound to give rise to subjectivity and uncertainty. One conceptual 
difficulty is that the meaning of a ‘public’ function will depend heavily on 
one’s political impressions as to the proper role of the state. On this issue there 
is considerable room for reasonable disagreement between Left and Right, as 
noted by e.g. Gillian Morris and Sandra Fredman, ‘The costs of exclusivity: 
public and private re-examined’ [1994] PL 69, at 72. 
 
13. It should also be remembered that judicial review is a regulatory regime with 
the overarching aim of ensuring that public power is exercised fairly towards 
those who are subject to it. The idea that the state should act fairly towards its 
subjects is uncontroversial, but the circumstances in which non-state 
defendants should be made to do so is once again a matter of largely political 
debate. There is no obviously correct answer to the general question of what 
fairness demands in private relationships. Narrower private-law questions as to 
whether liability should lie in discrete contexts like negligence, nuisance, 
contract, and so on, are likely to yield more straightforward answers. 
 
14. A potentially infinite number of considerations can come into play in 
determining the meaning of a public function. This is inherent in the courts’ 
multi-factorial approach as well as the nature of the issue itself. Space 
precludes an exhaustive analysis of the factors to have been considered in 
decided cases, but some of the more notable ones are as follows. 
 
15. First, it is relevant that the function is enmeshed in or underpinned by statute,3 
or that the defendant is woven into the fabric of government. These can be 
loosely termed ‘institutional’ factors since they examine the nature and extent 
of the defendant’s institutional relationship with the state. 
 
16. In Datafin, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Takeover Panel was amenable to 
judicial review notwithstanding that it exercised only de facto rather than 
statutory or prerogative power. Among the justifications given was the Panel’s 
relationship with organisations like the Department of Trade and Industry, 
Bank of England and Stock Exchange. The Panel had no legal power to 
enforce its City Code, but its source of power was ‘only partly based upon 
                                                 
3
 For a recent affirmation of the principle see R (Baker Tilly UK Audit LLP) v Financial Reporting 
Council [2015] EWHC 1398 (Admin), although the parties agreed rather than argued the amenability 
point. 
moral persuasion and the assent of institutions and their members’: Datafin, at 
838 (Donaldson MR). The ‘unspoken assumption’ or ‘bottom line’ was that 
these other organisations would use their own statutory and contractual powers 
to penalise transgressors of the Code: at 826, 838 (Donaldson MR). Despite 
the courts’ focus being on the function performed, the Panel’s institutional 
relationship with the state – its links with government and enmeshment in the 
wider regulatory scheme – was therefore an important factor in classifying that 
function. Bingham MR explained in Aga Khan (above) that the effect was ‘to 
extend judicial review to a body whose birth and constitution owed nothing to 
any exercise of governmental power but which had been woven into the fabric 
of public regulation’: at 921-923. 
 
17. Institutional considerations played an apparently decisive role in R (Beer) v 
Hampshire Farmer’s Markets Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1056, when the Court of 
Appeal ruled that a private company created by a local authority to take over 
the running a series of farmers’ markets was amenable to judicial review when 
rejecting the claimant’s application for permission to participate in the 
scheme. It was relevant to the decision that the company owed its existence to 
the local council, had stepped into the shoes of the council by running the 
markets, and that the council had assisted it in various ways such as providing 
office space, funding and staff. Their Lordships were clear that these factors 
were enough in themselves to render the function public. 
 
18. In Weaver (above) the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant, a registered 
social landlord that had sought to evict the claimant tenant for rent arrears, was 
performing a public function when managing and allocating housing stock. 
Only a small minority (10%) of that stock was transferred from local authority 
ownership. It was relevant that the defendant ‘operated in very close harmony’ 
with local authorities, assisting them to achieve their statutory duties and 
objectives in the social housing field, and that it was subject to ‘intrusive 
[legislative] regulation on various aspects of allocation and management’ that 
was designed to ‘ensure proper standards of performance in the public 
interest’: see [69]-[71] (Elias LJ).4 Dissenting, Rix LJ drew attention to the 
contractual relationship between claimant and defendant and argued (at [153]) 
that ‘a contract like a tenancy contract, for all that it is hedged around by 
statutory provisions, is made for the specific purpose of determining the rights 
between the parties.’ 
 
19. Beer and Weaver may be contrasted with R v Servite Houses, ex p Goldsmith 
(2001) 33 HLR 35, where no such institutional links existed. Moses J ruled 
that a private care home provider was performing only a private function when 
delivering residential care services pursuant to a contract with a local authority 
that was required by s 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948 to arrange that 
care. The ‘fatal impediment’ to the claim was said (at [89]) to be that the 
‘source of [Servite’s] powers is purely contractual, and the absence of any 
statutory underpinning.’ 
 
                                                 
4
 See also [101] (Collins MR). 
20. Second, it is relevant that the state would perform the function if the defendant 
did not. A further justification given by the Court of Appeal for its decision in 
Datafin was the ‘expressed willingness of the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry to limit legislation in the field of take-overs and mergers and to use 
the panel as the centrepiece of his regulation of that market’: at 838 
(Donaldson MR). The suggestion was therefore that the Panel performed a 
function that the state would have stepped in to perform but for the Panel’s 
existence. 
 
21. Various cases have considered the ‘but for’ criterion. It was accepted on both 
sides in Baker Tilly
5
 that the defendant was amenable to judicial review, in 
part because ‘the government would have to intervene to regulate these 
matters’ if the defendant did not: at [32] (Singh J). 
 
22. The test was applied but went unsatisfied in R v Football Association, ex p 
Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833. Rose J found (at 848) that there was 
no evidence ‘that if the FA did not exist the state would intervene to create a 
public body to perform its functions.’6 It also went unsatisfied in R v Chief 
Rabbi, ex p Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036. Simon Brown J stated (at 1041-
1042) that the Chief Rabbi’s disciplinary function over a junior rabbi was 
merely private. It was not a public function ‘in the sense that he is regulating a 
field of public life and but for his office the government would impose a 
statutory regime’, because ‘his functions are essentially intimate, spiritual and 
religious.’ 
 
23. Third, the extent to which the defendant wields monopoly or other potentially 
harmful power may be relevant, but judicial views on the matter are mixed. 
Concern was expressed in Datafin that the Panel, which wielded ‘enormous 
power’ and had a ‘giant’s strength’, should be accountable to the courts in the 
event that it went ‘off the rails’ and used its powers ‘in a way which was 
manifestly unfair’: (Donaldson MR, at 845; 827). Massingberd-Mundy 
(above) contains obiter remarks by Roch J (at 222) that the Jockey Club 
should be regarded as amenable to judicial review, partly on the basis that it 
‘holds a position of major national importance… [and] has near monopolistic 
powers in an area in which the public generally have an interest and in which 
many persons earn their livelihoods.’ 
 
24. More recently, Elias LJ held in R (Lewisham London Borough Council) v 
Assessment and Qualifications Alliance [2013] EWHC 211 (Admin) that 
judicial review could lie against assessment decisions made by GCSE 
awarding organisations notwithstanding the contractual basis of the 
relationship between the organisations and the schools who received their 
services. The function was said (at [139]) to be clearly public: ‘The 
determination of GCSE grades, taken by students across the country, is a 
matter of very significant public importance potentially affecting the life 
chances of those who are candidates for the examination’. 
 
                                                 
5
 Baker Tilly (fn 2). 
6
 The application of the test has been criticised: Michael Beloff QC and Tim Kerr, ‘Why Aga Khan is 
Wrong’ [1996] JR 30, 31. 
25. Views like these enjoy some support from academic writers. A number have 
suggested that the existence of monopoly or other potentially harmful power 
should be an important touchstone because of the scope for those wielding 
such power to act arbitrarily or otherwise unfairly. One writer once welcomed 
what he saw as the ‘growing acceptance of a philosophy that all those who 
wield power should be accountable and… subject to general principles of 
good administration’: Gordon Borrie, ‘The regulation of public and private 
power’ [1989] PL 552, at 558. Campbell (above) argues that monopoly power 
should be the touchstone when classifying the defendant’s function. 
 
26. Learned judges have criticised the idea, however. For instance, in Aga Khan 
(above), Hoffmann LJ opined (at 932) that ‘the mere fact of power, even over 
a substantial area of economic activity, is not enough… [to] subject [a 
defendant] to the rules of public law’. In the same case, and underscoring the 
courts’ orthodox approach towards contractual power and consensual 
submission to the defendant’s jurisdiction, Farquharson LJ acknowledged (at 
928) that newcomers to the horseracing industry were in practice consigned to 
accepting the Jockey Club’s jurisdiction but stated that ‘nobody is obliged to 
race his horses in this country’. As Simon Brown J stated in Wachmann 
(above, at 1041), amenability ‘means something more than that… [the 
defendant’s] decisions are decisions which may be of great interest or concern 
to the public or, indeed, which may have consequences for the public.’ 
 
27. Fourth, there is some authority to the effect that the absence of an alternative 
remedy may be relevant. This factor is closely linked to the previous one: the 
lack of an alternative remedy for the claimant will leave the defendant greater 
room to abuse its power. In R v Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex p Aegon 
Life Assurance Ltd [1994] CLC 88, Rose LJ appeared to gloss the usual 
approach to consensually-assumed jurisdiction by stating (at 93) that ‘Judicial 
review should not be extended to a body whose powers derive from agreement 
of the parties and when effective private law remedies are available against 
the body’ (emphasis added). In Datafin (above), Donaldson MR considered 
that Parliament might intervene to correct manifest unfairness on the part of 
the Takeover Panel but asked (at 827) ‘how long would that take and who in 
the meantime could or would come to the assistance of those who were being 
oppressed by such conduct?’. 
 
28. Again, however, criticisms have been expressed. Hoffmann LJ has stated that 
it improper to ‘try to patch up the remedies available against domestic bodies 
by pretending that they are organs of government’: Aga Khan (at 933). In R v 
Eurotunnel Developments, ex p Stephens (1997) 73 P & CR 1, Collins J stated 
(at 7) that ‘the absence of any obvious remedy does not translate what… is a 
clear private law matter to a public law matter.’ Along similar lines, Lord 
Oliver stated (at 580) in Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1988] 
AC 533 that the presence of an alternative remedy would be relevant to the 
court’s decision to permit judicial review but not to the prior question ‘of the 
existence of the jurisdiction’. The questions of amenability and alternative 
remedy were described as ‘separate issues’ in R (Shoesmith) v Ofsted [2011] 
EWCA Civ 642, at [87] (Maurice Kay LJ) and considered separately in Baker 
Tilly (above). 
29. I turn now to the three recent cases from 2016 mentioned above: R (Holmcroft 
Properties) v KPMG LLP [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin), R (Macleod) v 
Governors of Peabody Trust [2016] EWHC 737 (Admin) and T.H. v Chapter 
of Worcester Cathedral [2016] EWHC 1117 (Admin). I explain the facts and 
findings before briefly considering their significance for the law in this area. 
 
Holmcroft Properties 
 
30. The case followed the mis-selling of interest rate hedging products by 
Barclays Bank to some of its customers. Barclays agreed with the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) that it would establish a scheme to provide redress 
to certain customers who had been mis-sold. Under the agreement, KPMG 
was to oversee the implementation and application of the scheme as an 
independent party. Barclays was to make no offers of compensation to 
customers without KPMG’s approval. KPMG could only approve offers that it 
considered appropriate, fair and reasonable. 
 
31. Holmcroft Properties, the claimant, received an offer from Barclays that did 
not include compensation for consequential loss caused by the mis-sale. 
Holmcroft sought judicial review, arguing that KPMG’s decision to approve 
the offer was unfair because Barclays’ offer was calculated on the basis of 
undisclosed material. Holmcroft could not therefore advance its case on an 
informed basis. 
 
32. In a joint judgment, Elias LJ and Mitting J found against Holmcroft on both 
issues calling for resolution: (i) whether KPMG was amenable to judicial 
review and (ii) whether its decision to approve the offer breached any of the 
substantive grounds of review. 
 
33. As to the amenability issue, their Lordships began by explaining (at [23]) that:  
 
‘The principles are tolerably clear, albeit stated at a high level of abstraction, 
and they are not in dispute in this case. But their application in any particular 
case can be problematic and it is the application of the principles to the 
circumstances of this case which divides the parties.’ 
 
34. Citing Datafin and Beer, they then reiterated (at [24]) that source of power is 
not the sole test for amenability and (at [26]) that the matter ‘therefore requires 
a careful analysis of the function in issue’, before setting out the parties’ 
arguments and concluding (at [38]), albeit ‘not without some hesitation’ (at 
[41]), that KPMG’s duties did ‘not have sufficient public law flavour to render 
it amenable to judicial review’. 
 
35. Some factors were said (at [39]) by their Lordships to point towards 
publicness: 
 
(a) The Barclays-KPMG arrangement was ‘more than a mere private 
arrangement and the bank would never have conferred the veto power 
upon KPMG [to decline to approve offers] unless required to do so by the 
FCA as part of its regulatory functions’. 
(b) The FCA was required to approve Barclays’ initial appointment of KPMG 
as independent regulator of the compensation scheme. 
 
(c) The arrangement required KPMG to report to the FCA regularly through 
Barclays. KPMG was not simply assisting Barclays to comply with its 
own regulatory obligations but was ‘undertaking its duties both for 
Barclays and for the FCA so as to assist the latter in the effective 
performance of its regulatory functions.’ 
 
36. KPMG was therefore ‘woven into the regulatory function’ of the FCA. There 
was also a ‘clear public connection between its function and the regulatory 
duties carried out by the FCA’ (at [40]). 
 
37. The factors pointing against publicness nevertheless prevailed: 
 
(a) The FCA could have exercised more draconian powers but instead chose 
to ‘adopt an essentially voluntary scheme of redress’ that left Barclays free 
to ‘remedy their own errors’ and identify ‘unsophisticated customers who 
had been sold these products improperly’ (at [42]). 
 
(b) The fact that KPMG’s powers were conferred by contract with Barclays 
was ‘important’ albeit ‘not determinative’, and it was relevant that KPMG 
lacked any direct relationship with Barclays’ customers. Moreover, 
although the FCA approved KPMG’s appointment to the role, the 
appointment was made by Barclays itself (at [43]). 
 
(c) The mere fact that it could be said that KPMG was carrying out functions 
‘at the behest of a public body which, if performed by that public body, 
would be subject to public law principles’, was said (at [44]) to be 
insufficient to render it amenable to judicial review. 
 
(d) The FCA had no regulatory obligation to carry out the role played by 
KPMG had there been no willing skilled advisor like KPMG to do so. This 
was said (at [45]) to reinforce the first point, ‘that the arrangements were 
voluntary albeit under the cloud of more drastic statutory sanctions’. 
 
(e) The Barclays-KPMG arrangement did not exclude the FCA ‘from taking a 
more active role in particular cases’: at [46]. The FCA would have needed 
to investigate whether the arrangement was working in the event of a 
customer complaint that both Barclays and KPMG had acted unfairly, and 
would potentially be subject to judicial review itself when doing so. 
 
38. The fact that there was no effective redress to ensure that fair and reasonable 
offers were made was mentioned (at [48]) but evidently not significant. Any 
public law remedy would be a limited one given that only a civil action could 
generate damages. The purpose of the arrangement was not to ‘guarantee a fair 
outcome in each and every case’ but to ‘remedy a pattern of improper selling’ 
with a broad remedial scheme to be implemented ‘in good faith [and] with 
close supervision from an objective and independent party.’ Civil actions and 
possibly Ombudsman complaints could be taken up if the scheme as a whole 
failed to work as it should. 
 
39. Their Lordships briefly considered and discounted the possibility that there 
could be a contractual remedy in the event of an unfair and/or unreasonable 
offer being made, but cited Leech (above) and observed (at [50]) that the 
existence of any such remedy would be irrelevant to the question of whether 
KPMG was amenable to judicial review. 
 
Macleod 
 
40. The claimant was a tenant of the Peabody Trust at a London property that had 
been transferred from the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC). Peabody 
refused his request to exchange his tenancy with a tenant in Edinburgh. He 
sought judicial review of the decision. The allegations were that Peabody had 
unlawfully fettered its discretion and acted irrationally: by failing to follow its 
own policy in relation to mutual exchange, and failing to take account of its 
public sector equality duty (PSED) under s 149 of the Equality Act 2010. 
William Davis J found against the claimant on the amenability issue and on all 
substantive issues apart from s 149, but would in any event have declined 
judicial review on that issue because consideration of the PSED would have 
made no difference to the decision on the facts. 
 
41. As to the amenability point, his Lordship began (at [15]) by identifying 
Weaver (above) as the leading authority in relation to social housing providers 
and their public-law status. It was said (at [18]) to be unnecessary to look 
beyond that decision ‘for any issues of principle’. Weaver did not hold that all 
registered social landlords are amenable to judicial review, and so fell to be 
applied to the facts (at [20]). Ruling that Peabody was not amenable to review, 
his Lordship took the following factors into account (at [20]): 
 
(a) Peabody had purchased CEC properties using ‘funds raised on the open 
market, not via any public subsidy or grant.’ 
 
(b) It was not clear that these properties were ‘pure social housing’, even 
though they were ‘not let at a full market rent’. 
 
(c) Peabody was distinct from the landlord in Weaver because it ‘was not 
acting in close harmony with a local authority to assist the local authority 
to fulfil its statutory duty.’ 
 
(d) Rents for CEC-transferred properties ‘are not subject to the same level of 
statutory regulation as social housing in general’. 
 
Worcester Cathedral 
 
42. The claimant bell-ringer was a member of the Guild of Bell Ringers of 
Worcester Cathedral. The first defendant, the Chapter of Worcester Cathedral, 
revoked the claimant’s membership of the Guild following allegations of 
inappropriate conduct by the claimant towards children and younger bell-
ringers. The second defendant, the Bishop of Worcester, consequently invited 
the claimant to sign an agreement placing conditions on him bell-ringing in all 
other churches in the Diocese of Worcester. 
 
43. The claimant sought judicial review of both acts. The claim was principally 
brought on ECHR grounds under the HRA, but he also alleged that the 
decisions were irrational and unlawful for want of natural justice according to 
ordinary principles of domestic judicial review. As to the non-HRA claims, 
Coulson J ruled that neither defendant was amenable to judicial review. In any 
event, the substantive claims were either time-barred or unpersuasive. 
 
44. As to the non-HRA amenability issue, Coulson J began by observing (at [75]) 
that it is ‘important to look at the nature of the power being exercised as 
opposed to simply the source of that power’, and that it ‘is also important to 
consider the nature of the body in question’. By this was meant that it was 
necessary to consider a range of factors such as whether the defendants had 
stepped into the shoes of central local government, were subsidised by public 
funds or were democratically accountable – as well as (from Aga Khan, 
above) the ‘further issue about the voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of 
the body in question.’ It was also said to be important to consider the ‘type of 
action taken’. 
 
45. Coulson J made two further notable points (at [76]). First, citing Wachmann, 
his Lordship explained that it was ‘irrelevant’ to the amenability question that 
‘the decisions in question… have had a significant impact on the claimant’. 
Second, the argument that the claimant would be left without a remedy was 
‘also immaterial, because the administrative court [sic.] is not there simply to 
fill in the gaps left by statute or the common law.’ In this regard Coulson J 
cited the dicta of Hoffmann LJ in Aga Khan (above), about using judicial 
review to ‘patch up’ remedies against non-state defendants. 
 
46. The functions of both defendants in safeguarding others were merely private 
(see [77]). Neither defendant exercised any statutory powers, which Coulson J 
believed to ‘point to the conclusion that the decisions are not amenable to 
judicial review’. The defendants were also not part of any system of public 
regulation and did not receive any public funding. The defendants’ acts of 
controlling bell-ringers’ access to church towers was ‘analogous to the control 
of sporting associations’, such as the Jockey Club, to their premises and 
events. The defendants’ decisions were merely private, with ‘no public 
element to them’. 
 
Analysis 
 
47. It was unlikely that any of these first-instance cases would break new ground. 
The main principles are already well established in this area, and it is in the 
nature of the multi-factorial approach that a considerable range of factors are 
potentially relevant to the courts’ analysis to a greater or lesser degree 
anyway. Nevertheless, some broad observations about the decisions may be 
made from the dicta cited above. 
 
48. First, their Lordships in Holmcroft and Worcester Cathedral affirm the 
longstanding view that the courts’ overriding concern in the amenability 
context is the nature of the power. Nevertheless, in both judgments source 
appears to remain a weighty factor. In Worcester Cathedral the lack of any 
statutory powers on the defendants’ part pointed against amenability. 
Moreover, both Worcester Cathedral and Holmcroft emphasise the consensual 
element to the powers in question: controlling bell-ringers’ access to churches 
was likened to the activities of sporting regulators, and it was ‘important’ that 
KPMG’s powers were conferred by contract with Barclays in order to create a 
‘voluntary’ remedial scheme. 
 
49. Second, all three judgments show that institutional factors nevertheless 
continue to play an important role. In Worcester Cathedral Coulson J 
expressly mentioned that it was necessary to consider the nature of the body in 
question, and identified as relevant the fact that neither defendant was part of a 
system of public regulation. In Macleod, Peabody was distinguished from the 
landlord in Weaver because it lacked the same close relationship with local 
authorities and enmeshment in a statutory regulatory regime. In Holmcroft it 
was said to tell in favour of review that KPMG had been woven into the 
FCA’s regulatory function, albeit that countervailing factors telling against 
review eventually prevailed. 
 
50. Third, both Holmcroft and Worcester Cathedral affirm the views expressed in 
cases like Aga Khan, Stephens and Leech that the lack of an alternative 
remedy for the claimant is irrelevant to the amenability question. In Worcester 
Cathedral Coulson J is clear that the exercise of mere power or the ‘impact’ of 
a function on the claimant are irrelevant factors. Along similar lines, William 
Davis J emphasised in Macleod (at [21]) that the performance of a function 
affecting the public is also not enough: ‘True it is that some public function 
was fulfilled [by the defendant] by the provision of homes for key workers in 
London. However, in my judgment the cumulative effect of the various 
factors… does not have the sufficiency of public flavour… found in Weaver.’ 
Publicness is therefore about more than mere power, or than the injustice of a 
function being exercised without regulation in judicial review. 
 
51. Fourth, Holmcroft appears to make thinly-veiled reference to the ‘but for’ test. 
It was said to be relevant that the FCA had no regulatory obligation to perform 
KPMG’s role had no skilled advisor performed it. The case therefore 
represents another example of the test being applied but unsatisfied. Leaving 
aside Baker Tilly (above), in which the amenability point was agreed rather 
than argued by the parties, it seems doubtful that any defendant could satisfy 
the ‘but for’ test in the absence of very close institutional links of the sort 
present in Datafin (above), where the Government had made it clear that the 
Takeover Panel was being deliberately absorbed into its regulatory strategy, 
such that the lack of a statutory basis was a ‘complete anomaly’: at 835 
(Donaldson MR).
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 Indeed, the Panel’s functions do now have a direct statutory basis under the Companies Act 2006. 
Conclusion 
 
52. It is not surprising that in Holmcroft their Lordships recognised that the 
amenability principles are not always easily applied. The courts continue to 
assert the formal position that the overriding concern is the nature of the 
function, while the analyses themselves – in all three cases – continue to 
accord significant weight to institutional and/or source-based considerations. 
 
53. The precise weight to accord the various considerations in play is, moreover, a 
matter of some uncertainty. Since the multi-factorial approach involves 
balancing factors together rather than attempting to fashion bright-line rules 
about when review will and will not lie, even clear trends that are firmly 
rooted in the case-law are capable of being outweighed in a given case if the 
circumstances are thought to demand it. One has sympathy with William 
Davis J in Macleod for deciding the amenability point on the basis of Weaver 
alone, thereby avoiding a foray into the morass of amenability case-law that 
has steadily accrued since Datafin. There is no guarantee that such an exercise 
would have provided any clearer guidance as to how to resolve the issue. 
 
54. Holmcroft, Macleod and Worcester Cathedral are largely orthodox judgments 
that amply illustrate the challenge facing judges in this area of law. Especially 
given the theoretical difficulty inherent in determining the meaning of a public 
function, a sense of ‘feel’ or ‘instinct’, as well as close reference to the facts of 
the individual case, will inevitably – and perhaps frustratingly – remain a 
staple part of the courts’ approach. 
